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Rethinking Jurisdiction
and Notice in Kentucky
BY JoHN R. LEATHERS*
INTRODUCTION

When most of the attorneys now practicing in Kentucky were
law students, the subject of jurisdiction, much like Caesar's Gaul,
was divided into three parts-actions were either in personam,
in rem or quasi in rem. The current jurisdictional and notice provisions found in Kentucky statutes and procedural rules also date
from that era of tripartite jurisdiction. However, recent United
States Supreme Court decisions revising jurisdictional thinking have
greatly changed the jurisdictional landscape. Current jurisdictional
theories bear as much resemblance to the traditional divisions as
modern day France bears to Caesar's Gaul-the outer dimensions
are familiar, but internally they are entirely different.
This Article will examine the impact of the recent jurisdictional developments on Kentucky jurisdictional and notice provisions. It is hoped that this examination will alert practitioners to
the effect of modem developments on existing law, serve as a guide
to avoid pitfalls and be a catalyst for a comprehensive reform of
this area. Although it is not within the scope of this Article to treat
the jurisdictional theories as comprehensively as in law school, a
review of relevant concepts and cases will be undertaken to enable
a better understanding of recent case law developments.
I.
A.

RETHINKING JURISDICTION

JurisdictionToday

The focal point of any jurisdictional problem is the nonresident of the forum, whether that nonresident be a natural person
or a corporate entity. Nonresidents rather than residents are the
focus because states were allowed to exercise in personam jurisdic-

Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.B.A. 1968, University of Texas at El
Paso; J.D. 1971, University of New Mexico; L.L.M. 1973, Columbia University.
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tion over their residents even in the days when a forum's jurisdiction was strictly based on territorialism. States could exercise such
jurisdiction over their residents even though the resident might
be absent from the forum when the action began. Such jurisdiction over residents was approved in Pennoyer v. Neff,' and
jurisdiction over an absent resident was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Milliken v. Meyer.2 For a long period of our
history, it was difficult to develop a theory of forum jurisdiction
over nonresidents which would accommodate our traditional
perceptions of the sovereignty of the nonresident's home state as
well as the forum state. Allowing a forum to assert jurisdiction
over a sister state's resident arguably intruded on the sister state's
sovereignty; yet, refusing jurisdiction over claims related to the
forum similarly intrudes on the forum's sovereignty. Given these
conflicting claims of sovereignty, and the status of the conflicting
states as equals in a union, it is not at all surprising that the difficulties have found their solution in federal law, primarily in the
form of Supreme Court cases.
The starting place in analyzing the current status of jurisdiction over nonresidents must always be the centerpiece of the
topic-the case" of Pennoyer v. Neff. 3 For those who may have
feared for the vitality of the old casebook favorite, tales of its
demise, like those of the death of Mark Twain, have been greatly
exaggerated. Pennoyer is as valid today for the point on which
it is seminal as it was more than a hundred years ago. That seminal
point was its conclusion that the due process clause of the federal
constitution 4 applies to state court assertions of jurisdiction; thus,
a state's exercise of jurisdiction in excess of the permissible limits
results in a judgment which is void in the rendering state. 5
Prior to Pennoyer, the Supreme Court's position had been that
state judgments rendered in excess of permissible jurisdictional
limits were not entitled to enforcement in sister states under the
full faith and credit clause.6 In holding to that effect as early as
195

U.S. 714 (1878).

2 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
3 95 U.S. at 714.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 95 U.S. at 733.

6 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
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1850, the Supreme Court stated that such refusal to enforce judgments rendered without jurisdiction had been a well-settled matter under international law when the Constitution was adopted.1
Adopting its reasoning from the full faith and credit cases decided
after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Court in Pennoyer held that such judgments, in addition to not being enforceable in sister states, violated the due process clause and were void
in the rendering state.
Pennoyer'sfacts clearly illustrate the type of connection with
the nonresident required for a proper assertion of jurisdiction: the
defendant had to 1) be a resident; 2) be personally served within
the state; or 3) voluntarily appear. 8 While our notions of the
contacts necessary for assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents
have changed greatly since Pennoyer,9 the basic premise of Pennoyer is still good law-an attempt by a state to adjudicate in excess of permissible standards is violative of due process. 10 As a
result, a state's power to adjudicate is federally determined under
the due process clause. Any state not wanting to have its judgments
subject to attack as violative of due process obviously must conform its jurisdictional assertions to federally-determined standards.
The traditional tripartite jurisdictional philosophy divided adjudications into three classes. An in personam adjudication created
an obligation personal to the defendant; such obligation followed
the defendant and was enforceable in sister states under the full
faith and credit clause." Adjudications in rem and quasi in rem
were similar in that both bound the interests of persons in property. The nature of the property involved was not important; both
adjudications could affect real or intangible property. The distinc7 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165 (1850).
8 95 U.S. at 719-20.

9 Permissible state jurisdictional power has steadily expanded through the years in
response to changes in the basic nature of our society. For a discussion of this expansion,

see Hazard, A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241.
10 It is quite significant in this regard that the two most recent Supreme Court
jurisdictional cases involving nonresidents have struck state assertions of jurisdiction as
violative of due process. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In so doing, the Court is showing
a preference for the pro-defendant line of reasoning which originated in Hanson v. Denck-

la, 357 U.S. 235 (1965).
11 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENIS § 1 (1942).
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tion between the two was in the breadth of the binding effect of
the judgment. An action in rem was said to bind the interests of
the entire world in the thing; 2 an action quasi in rem was said
to bind the interests of all named parties in the thing. 13
The tripartite jurisdictional theory offered the Supreme Court
an opportunity to come to philosophical grips with the conflict
between a potential forum and a nonresident's home state. If a
nonresident was not served with process in the forum and did not
voluntarily appear, a forum could nevertheless adjudicate his or
her interest in property within the forum either vis a vis the world
(in an in rem action) or vis a vis other parties (in a quasi in rem
action). This power derived from the forum's inherent authority
over property within its territory and did not intrude on the
sovereignty of the nonresident's home state since the nonresident's
14
interests were affected only "indirectly."'
After Pennoyer, the fiction that such assertions of jurisdiction
are permissible because they only affect the nonresident indirectly became ripe for repudiation. Generations of law students learned
from the famous facts of Harrisv. Balk 15 that a defendant's loss
of money is no more palatable when taken by garnishment from
his debtor than from the defendant directly-either way Balk was
out some $300. Whatever may have been the historical reasons
for the theory, courts began to realize that "an adverse judgment
in rem directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his
rights in the property before the court."' 6
After a long history, the fiction that an in rem judgment only
affected the defendant indirectly has now been overturned because
"[t]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification.' 7 In the 1977 landmark decision of Shaffer v. Heitner,18
the Supreme Court laid to rest the tripartite jurisdictional theory.
12Id. § 2.
13

Id. § 3.

14 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722.

198 U.S. 215 (1905).
16 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977).
17 Id. at 212.
18 Id. at 186.
'5
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The Court held that all assertions of jurisdiction, both in personam
and in rem, 9 must be judged by the due process standards

previously developed in such in personam cases"° as International
2
Shoe Co. v. Washington. 1
The demise of the "presence" oriented jurisdictional system

cannot be said to have come as a surprise. One can find concessions even during the heyday of territorialism that the directindirect distinction was simply a fiction.22 Further, for more
than thirty years the Court has required the standard of notice

previously applicable to in personam cases to be followed in proceedings in rem as well.21 Shaffer brought into a parallel position
the constitutional requirements of jurisdiction and of notice.
The debate over the meaning and effects of Shaffer began
swiftly and still continues.Y However, one thing is clear: in all
cases, jurisdiction will be measured by a unified standard, with

such standard coming from the interpretations of jurisdictional
due process found in previous in personam cases. Additionally,
in rejecting the direct-indirect dichotomy, Shaffer apparently recognizes that all judgments are in personam because all judgments
affect persons: either the person or a property interest.
This recognition of the personal nature of all judgments does
not necessarily make a significant alteration of previous state asser-

tions of power through in rem jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the Court
was careful to note that prior assertions of in rem jurisdiction fell
into two categories: Type I, in which the asserted claim arose from

19 The Court included the concepts of both in rem and quasi in rem in the terminology "in rem." Id. at 199 n.17. This Article will similarly incorporate both concepts
within the single term.
2o Id. at 212.
21 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 "All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in rem depends on the number of persons affected." Tyler v. Judges
of the Court of Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
' Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
24 Among the commentaries on the case, see Leathers, The First Two Years After
Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REv. 907 (1980); Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,66 KY. L.J. 1 (1977-78); Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner:
Holdings, Implications,Forebodings,30 HASTiNGs L.J. 1183 (1979); Silberman, Shaffer
v. Heitner; The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978); Smit, The Importance of
Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 519 (1979).
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the thing which was the jurisdictional focus; and Type II, in which
the asserted claim was unrelated to the res which was the jurisdictional focus.2 As to Type I, the Court noted that existing state
assertions would not be restricted since the presence in the forum
state of the property from which the claim arose would normally
satisfy the minimum contacts standard of InternationalShoe.2
The more significant impact of Shaffer on existing jurisdictional
schemes is to disallow jurisdiction based on the presence of property when the claim asserted is unrelated to the property.Y Although most jurisdictional claims based on the presence of property will be constitutionally permissible, Shaffer suggests that assertions like that in Harrisv. Balk2s are no longer constitutional.
This conclusion is bolstered by the decision of the Court in Rush
v. Savchuk.
Although Shaffer apparently leaves unchanged the outer limits
of state adjudicatory authority, the effect of such a unified jurisdictional theory on a particular state is more difficult to assess.
Due process simply serves as an outer limit on state jurisdictional
power; the breadth of the permissible jurisdiction utilized by any
particular state depends on the state legislature's judgment of how
much jurisdictional potential ought to be implemented.2 Although the typical means of implementing jurisdictional power
is through a long-arm statute, 3' there is no reason why legislative
authority must be completely contained in one statute. Any statute
which authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents
would operate, in effect, as a long-arm provision as to the type

25 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208. For further discussion of Type I and Type

II categories of in rem jurisdiction, see Leathers, SubstantiveDue ProcessControlof Quasi
in Rem Jurisdiction,supra note 24.
2 433 U.S. at 207-08.
27 Id. at 208-09.
28 198 U.S. at 215. No evidence could be found that such usages were ever in vogue
in Kentucky, although Pendleton v. Pendleton, 112 S.W. 674 (Ky. 1908), is similar.
2 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980). Kentucky was not one of the few jurisdictions to use

in rem jurisdiction over nonresident tort-feasors through attachment of their liability insurance policies.
30 Such potential authority is not self-implementing. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
31 Kentucky has had such a statute since 1968. See KY. REv. STAT. § 454.210 (BobbsMerrill Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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of claim the statute authorizes. Thus, it seems that pre-Shaffer
statutory authority, though originally based on the tripartite jurisdictional theory, may now serve as statutory authority to implement a unified jurisdictional theory. Although the continued validity of a state's jurisdictional statutes, such as Kentucky's, can
be generally justified, a shift in the underlying jurisdictional theory
may require some adjustments of the statutory particulars to make
the entire scheme fit together consistently. In any attempt to devise

a unified jurisdictional scheme for Kentucky, one important goal
is to minimize the number of changes. To the best of this author's
knowledge, there is no comprehensive view of Kentucky jurisdiction available.32 Hence, the following discussion illustrates where
we have been in addition to where we are and where we need
to make changes.
B.

Jurisdictionin Kentucky
1.

Kentucky's Long-Arm Statute

The primary statute authorizing the Kentucky judiciary to ex-

ercise jurisdiction over nonresidents is the Kentucky long-arm statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 454.210. The statute
is adequate to give the state jurisdiction over most claims which
are sufficiently related to the state to satisfy due process. It is derived almost verbatim from the model act,-1 which was designed
to implement broad state adjudicatory authority, and has been
interpreted broadly by the Kentucky courts. 34 Since the statute

32 The Kentucky long-arm statute is discussed in Phillips, The Kentucky Long Arm

Statute: How 'Long' Is It?, 4 N. KY. L. Rrv. 65 (1977). Additional observations on the
statute will be made in this Article which will expand treatment of jurisdiction over
nonresidents into other jurisdictional areas not previously covered in Kentucky.
33
UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 459, 466
(1980). KRS § 454.210(2) (a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1982) is an addition to the original uniform
act creating products liability jurisdiction for cases utilizing a warranty theory rather than
the negligence theory covered by KES § 454.210(2)(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982). KRS §
454.210(2)(a)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1982) is another addition authorizing paternity and support actions in cases of sufficient connection to Kentucky.
34 For cases in which broad coverage has been extended, see Poyner v. Erma Werke
Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Volvo of Am. v. Wells,
551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). This is not to say that the statute covers every case
arguably connected with Kentucky. For a case finding no jurisdiction under the statute,
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has been discussed at length elsewhere, only some observations
about two particular inadequacies in the statute are discussed here.
One restriction placed upon the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts
by the long-arm statute is that it only creates jurisdiction over a
"claim arising from the person's" commission of the various acts
specified in the statute." Thus, if a nonresident conducts a sufficient amount of business in Kentucky to activate the transacting
business provision of the act,s Kentucky courts have jurisdiction
only if the claim asserted arose from the business done in Kentucky. The fact that the claim arises from the contact is significant but it is by no means dispositive of the due process sufficiency of the contact. The United States Supreme Court has approved,
in at least one case, jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claim
did not arise from the nonresident's contact with the forum. 37
However, this limitation on Kentucky jurisdiction may in fact
be a strength. Preventing Kentucky courts from exercising jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process may be a wise policy
choice. Our trial courts are already overburdened. When one looks
at priorities in allocating judicial resources, it seems sensible to
give court attention to those claims which arise from the particular
contact with Kentucky. This prevents Kentucky courts from being burdened with claims which arise from dealings elsewhere.
The latter suits are best brought in the state where they arise. The
limitation unfortunately does bar some claims by Kentucky plaintiffs, but they can proceed elsewhere. Also, such cases are probably insignificant when compared with the number of claims
which could be brought here by nonresident plaintiffs in the

see Tube Turns Div. of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App.

1978).
35 KRS § 454.210(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
36 Id. § 454.210(2)(a)(1).
37 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 437. The defendant in
Benguet Mining was a corporation which held gold and silver mines in the PhUllipines.

Its operations there were halted when the Japanese occupied the Phillipines during World
War II. The president of Benguet Mining returned to his home in Ohio and carried on
some of the routine business of the corporation. While there, the corporation was sued
in an Ohio court by a stockholder seeking payment of dividends and damages. The Supreme
Court recognized that the cause of action did not arise from the corporate activities conducted in Ohio. See id. at 438. Nonetheless, the Court held that Ohio's exercise of jurisdiction
over the corporation did not violate the due process clause. Id. at 448.
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absence of such a restriction. On balance, then, the restriction is
not constitutionally required but is a sound policy choice.
The more significant limitation present in the Kentucky longarm statute is the restriction that, in claims arising from interests
in property, the relationship between the nonresident and the property must have been voluntarily created by the nonresident and
the nonresident must have knowingly performed or failed to perform the act on which jurisdiction is predicated.3 The model act
does not contain the qualifying provisions about knowing creation
and knowing performance. 39 Since this provision offers the state
an opportunity to assert in personam jurisdiction in cases which
might otherwise have fallen within in rem jurisdiction, 4 0 this
restriction seems especially unfortunate after the developments
brought about by Shaffer v. Heitner. Taken literally, the statute
will not support jurisdiction over a claim against a property owner
who inherited property in Kentucky, since inheritance is not a
voluntary creation of the relationship. This anomaly could possibly
be avoided by saying that a failure to renounce the inheritance
amounts to a voluntary creation. That argument has an existential quality to it but as a legal argument will not go far. Rather
than have courts resort to such sophistry, and in order to correct
an unfortunate gap in the statute, the statute should be amended
so that a court has jurisdiction over a claim arising from a person's "having an interest in, using or possessing real property in
this Commonwealth." All language in the statute after that phrase
should be deleted.
2.

Other Statutory Grants of Jurisdiction
Over Nonresidents

Although the major source of nonresident jurisdiction in Kentucky is the long-arm statute, Kentucky has many other statutory
provisions which allow adjudication of claims involving nonresident interested parties. After Shaffer, these statutes function in
3KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
39 See UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03(5). 13 U.L.A.

at 466 (simply allows jurisdiction as to a claim arising from a nonresident's "[having an
interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state.")
40 See e.g., Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938).
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effect as specialized long-arm statutes for particular types of claims.
In pre-Shaffer days, these assertions of jurisdiction were based on
the relationship which the state had with property having its situs
in the state. During that era, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that states possessed such adjudicatory authority based
on the situs of either real4 or intangible42 property. Shaffer
should not affect these various statutory provisions, since invariably
the sort of claim allowed by the statute does arise from the property itself and such a claim plus a presence connection should be
sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test. This is not to say,
however, that Shaffer does not pose other problems for these statutory schemes, but that is a point best discussed after a survey
of the existing jurisdictional statutes.
a.

Divorce Jurisdiction

Kentucky courts are currently authorized to exercise divorce
jurisdiction if "Ilthe court finds that one of the parties, at the time
the action was commenced, resided in this state

. . .

and that the

residence... has been maintained for 180 days next preceding
the filing of the petition."' 43 This statutory provision affects
nonresidents in that it allows "ex parte" divorces, in which the
petitioner is a resident of Kentucky and the respondent a nonresident. The United States Supreme Court has upheld such ex parte
proceedings as constitutionally valid." Kentucky has upheld such
jurisdiction under the Kentucky statute based solely on the
residence of the petitioner. 45 The traditional explanation of the
jurisdictional basis in Kentucky was that the procedure was in
rem. 46 The decision in Shaffer should not affect the ability of the
state to grant such divorces, so long as the scope of the adjudication is limited solely to dissolution of the marriage. Determina-

41 Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890);
Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886).
42 Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. 139 (1868).
43 KRS § 403.140(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
44 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
45 Kenmont Coal Co. v. Fisher, 259 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
46 Gayle v. Gayle, 192 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1946); Downs v. Downs' Adm'r, 96 S.W.
536 (Ky. 1906).
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tions of such matters as property division, child custody, support
and maintenance still would require personal jurisdiction over the
respondent. 47 However, Shaffer does require a recognition that
the divorce decree, although limited, does affect the absent spouse

personally and thus is an in personam judgment against that absent spouse. "[When the court assumes to pronounce the decree
destroying the married status of one of the consorts, it must
necessarily destroy that status as to the other ...."48
Divorce illustrates the classification of jurisdiction after Shaffer. Such an adjudication is personal, in that it has a direct effect
on the nonresident, but is limited in scope by the fact that Kentucky is using specific jurisdiction-aspecies of jurisdiction related
to the specific nature of the claim asserted. 49 This is the form of
jurisdiction authorized by Kentucky's long-arm statute and by specialized statutes such as the divorce statute. The only place in which
Kentucky exercises unlimited generaljurisdictionis over Kentucky
residents. The limited nature of the decree should not, however,
make us lose sight of the basic facts that 1) such jurisdiction survives Shaffer, but 2) the decree operates as a personal judgment
against the nonresident spouse.
b.

Eminent Domain

Procedures for the condemnation of property for public use
are created in Kentucky today by the Eminent Domain Act, °
with compensation for such taking required by Kentucky's constitution. 5' The statutes vest the authority for such proceedings in
the "circuit court of the county in which.

. .

the property sought

to be condemned is located ....,"52 While this localizing provision is in part a venue limitation, it also implies that the state's
eminent domain power extends only over property subject to its
47 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948). These decisions would prevent the cutting off of alimony rights upheld in Kentucky in Hughes v. Hughes, 278 S.W. 121 (Ky. 1925).
4 278 S.W. at 123.
49 For a discussion of these jurisdictional concepts, see VonMehren & Trautman,
Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
So KRS §§ 416.540-.680 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
51 Ky. CONSr. § 242.
52 KRS § 416.570 (Cum.Supp. 1982).
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territorial authority. Obviously, an eminent domain proceeding
must bind even nonresidents who have some interest in the property, and the statutes require the joinder of nonresident interested
parties.5 Even the earliest Kentucky case law in the area indicates that nonresidents are bound by such proceedings.Y By no
stretch of the imagination should Shaffer destroy the power of the
state to condemn property for public use; such power by necessity must include the ability to bind the interests of nonresident interested parties. The effect which Shaffer should have on the proceedings is to require courts to recognize that the resulting judgment foreclosing the property interest of the nonresident is personal. As in other such cases, the scope of the judgment is limited,
but is nonetheless personal.
c.

Escheat

Like most states, Kentucky has statutory procedures by which
the state can succeed to ownership of property which has been
lost or abandoned. Escheat is authorized as to such property "having a situs in this state." In Kentucky, the escheat of property
is not done by judicial proceeding, but rather by administrative
act of the Department of Revenue.5 6 Following such action, any
person claiming an interest in the escheated property has five years
in which to begin an action questioning the escheat.' If the contestant is not satisfied with the administrative disposition of the
claim, he or she may question the decision in Franklin Circuit
Court.- In that proceeding, "all... persons required by law to
be made parties in actions in rem or quasi in rem" must be
joined. 59 This joinder directive reveals that the traditional juris3 KRS § 416.590 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides in part that "[tihe clerk shall make
such orders as to nonresidents and persons under disability as are required by the statutes
and Rules of Civil Procedure in actions against them in circuit courts."
54 Cowan v. Glover, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 356 (1821), so holds as to a nonresident of the county where condemnation is sought. For cases with similar effect concern-

ing all nonresidents, both of the county and of Kentucky, see Louisville & N. Ry. v. Powers,
105 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1937); Tracy v. Elizabethtown, L. & B.S.R.R., 80 Ky. 259 (1882).
5 KRS § 393.020 (1972).
56 Id. § 393.110 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
5 Id. § 393.140(1) (1972).
5 Id. § 393.160.
59 Id.
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dictional basis was in rem, based on the situs of the property being within the state's territorial jurisdiction.
In a leading United States Supreme Court decision, both the
in rem basis of jurisdiction and the administrative procedure for
implementing the Kentucky law were upheld as constitutionally valid.6 The jurisdictional claim arises from feudal tenures
in land, 61 and is "an indisputable . . . right in the Commonwealth"6 2 based "upon the right and power of the government to
possess property within its jurisdiction for which there seems to
be no owner."' This power is present both as to personalty and
realty having a situs in Kentucky.64 Again, Shaffer does not preclude jurisdiction in such cases, although the judgment which
results is limited to the value of the property escheated. However,
such adjudication is personal but limited since it is an adjudication which affects the interest of the nonresident in the escheated
property.
d.

Probate Proceedings

Probate proceedings in Kentucky are jurisdictionally assigned
to the district court of the county of the testator's residence.63 In
the event the testator had no Kentucky residence, the appropriate
district court is in the county in which the testator left land or,
should there be no land, where the testator died or left a debt or
demand as part of the estate.r6 In such cases, the propounder of
the will may have interested parties summoned to the proceeding,67 or the court may order interested parties summoned.68 In
either instance the statute contemplates an ability to summon non-

60 Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,

321 U.S. 233 (1944).

61 For an excellent account of the history of the practice, see Commonwealth v.
Chicago, St. L. & N.O. R.R., 99 S.W. 596 (Ky. 1907).

62 Commonwealth v. Blanton's Ex'rs, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 393, 400 (1842).
63 Trustees of Transylvania Presbytery, U.S.A., Inc. v. Garrard County Bd. of
Educ., 348 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Ky. 1961).
64 Commonwealth v. Thomas' Adm'r, 131 S.W. 797, 800 (Ky. 1910).
6 KRS § 394.140 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
6
6

Id.

67 Id. § 394.170.
68 Id. § 394.180 (1972).
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resident interested parties.6 The statutes even authorize the proceeding in district court to go forward without the summoning
of any interested party, 70 a procedure which has been upheld as
valid.

71

Any person aggrieved by a probate decision of the district court
has two years after probate to challenge that decision in circuit
court. 72 In such a proceeding in the circuit court, the statute

directs the joinder of "all necessary parties."73 This clause has
been interpreted to compel joinder of those persons in whose favor
probate concluded, 74 all devisees under the will 75 and any other
party necessary "to settle finally and conclusively, all litigation
as to a contested will."' 76 Such adjudication in circuit court is
final and preclusive, except for appeal, against those who were
parties. 77 Parties who were only constructively served or who
were interested but not joined have a three-year grace period in
which to seek modification of the circuit court judgment 78 to the
extent necessary to relieve them from the effects of such judgment. 79 There is some authority that the probate of a will in the
wrong county is void and thus may be questioned at any time,
notwithstanding these time limits. 0 However, a will probated in
the correct county will finally result in a judgment which is fully
dispositive of the issues and can only be challenged within these
time periods.
Following the time periods discussed, the probate proceeding
has the effect of binding all interested persons. Thus, nonresidents
may be bound by probate proceedings after the expiration of the
three-year grace period, even though they had only constructive

6 Id. § 394.190 (Cure. Supp. 1982) provides for service by warning order upon such
persons.
70 Id. § 394.220.
71 See Crain v. Crain, 104 S.W.2d 992, 994 (Ky. 1937).
72 KRS § 394.240(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
73 Id. § 394.260.
74 Security Trust Co. v. Swope, 118 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. 1938).
75 Vancleave v. Beam, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 155, 155 (1834).
76 Rogers v. Thomas, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 390, 398 (1841).
77 See KRS § 394.260 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
78 Id. § 394.280(1) (1972).
71 See § 394.280(2).

So See Miller v. Swan, 14 S.W. 964 (Ky. 1890).
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service."' Shaffer does not impair the ability of the state to pro-

vide a proceeding which will finally wind up the decedent's affairs; because the jurisdiction of the court is based on either the
residence of the testator or the situs of the testator's property, these
are sufficient connections to bind the nonresidents personally to
the limited extent of the property involved in the probate. Again,
however, it is significant to note that the judgment binding the
nonresident in regard to this property is one which does affect his
personal interests.
e.

Quiet Title Actions

Kentucky by statute authorizes any person claiming legal title
to land to seek a judicial decision in the county where the land
is located.8 - Although this quiet title action is available only to
a person in possession of the land, s3 the defendant's failure to
assert a lack of possession by the plaintiff waives this requirement. sr For persons not in possession, an action in ejectment is
the proper way to assert their title.8- The traditional justification
for the state's jurisdiction in such cases was its in rem powers based
on the presence of the land.86 The United States Supreme Court
has always showed great deference to the need for a state to have
exclusive power over land located within the state 7 and has directly affirmed the power of the state to quiet title to real property within its borders.8 This jurisdiction over land within a state
includes the ability to bind nonresidents by such determinations
because
[ilf a state has no power to bring a non-resident into its courts
for [such ] purposes by publication, it is impotent to perfect the
81 Miller v. Hill, 168 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1943).
82 KRS § 411.120 (1972).
83 This requirement is consistent not only with the plain statutory language but also
with more than two dozen cases beginning with Harris v. Smith, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 10 (1834)
and continuing through Noland v. Wise, 259 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1953).
g4 Waiver has been upheld in a dozen cases from Johnson v. Farris, 131 S.W. 183
(Ky. 1910) through Waller v. Parsley, 229 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1950).
85 See Wood v. Corman, 211 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Ky. 1948).
86 See Myers v. Pedigo, 72 S.W. 734 (Ky. 1903).
87 See Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
88 See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. at 274-75.
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titles of real estate within its limits held by its own citizens; and
a cloud cast upon such title by a claim of a non-resident will
remain for all time a cloud. 89

In view of the special relationship between a state and the land
located within its boundaries, Kentucky has no jurisdiction to quiet
title to land located in other states.90 By the same token, only
Kentucky has jurisdiction to quiet title to land located in Kentucky. Because the action was traditionally classified as in rem,
such adjudications could bind the interests of nonresidents in the
property located in Kentucky. Without such power to bind nonresidents, it would not have been possible "to make all adverse
claimants defendants," 91 and thus quiet the title.
Nothing in Shaffer suggests that its holding will restrict the
essential sovereign authority of the state over land within its borders. Indeed, quite apart from the majority's observations concerning claims arising from the thing, 92 concurring opinions by
Justice Powel 9 3 and Justice Stevens94 indicate that jurisdiction
over real property in such cases as quiet title will still be within
the states' jurisdictional power. The only change necessitated by
Shaffer is a recognition that a quiet title judgment affects a nonresident personallyin that it determines the rights of the nonresident
in the land. Although that is the extent of its effect on the nonresident, it nevertheless is personal, as are all judgments after Shaffer.
f.

Trusts

Kentucky statutorily gives a court personal jurisdiction over
the trustee of a trust which has been registered in that court as
required by law.95 In the event the required registration has not
taken place, any court in which the trust could have been registered
89 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. at 320.
90 See Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Birch v. Birch, 239 S.W.2d
483 (Ky. 1951); Middleton's Trustee v. Middleton, 189 S.W. 1133 (Ky. 1916).
91 Kincaid v. McGowan, 4 S.W. 802, 806 (Ky. 1887).
92 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208.
93 See id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
94 See id. at 217 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
95 See KRS § 386.655 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The circumstances under which a trustee
is required to register a trust with the appropriate district or circuit court are spelled out
in § 386.655.
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has personal jurisdiction over the trustees. 96 The registration in

effect makes Kentucky the situs of the trust, and judicial proceedings concerning the trust are authorized in this state.97 Such proceedings can bind all beneficiaries of the trust, whether they are
residents or nonresidents of Kentucky, provided proper notice is
given.98 Historically, such proceedings at the situs have been approved upon the theory that the court's "proceedings are ... quasi
in rem, and the jurisdiction acquired . . . is exclusive.""0 Thus,

jurisdiction has been upheld in a court of the county which is the
situs of the trust even though a portion of the trust corpus may
consist of realty located in another state.'00
Kentucky courts have been cautious when exercising jurisdiction over a trust having its situs elsewhere, l 1 even in the face of
a compelling Kentucky interest in exercising such jurisdiction. Historically, the courts also have been careful to restrict their jurisdiction over trusts to only the county of registration,102 a position
which may have been relaxed by the statutory creation of concurrent jurisdiction rather than exclusive.1l° The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that a proceeding to determine the interest
of a person in a trust is an action in rem,'M with such an adjudication being conclusive upon the rights of nonresidents as well as
residents.10- Shaffer should not alter the ability of Kentucky to
adjudicate the rights of persons in a trust which has its situs in
Kentucky; such power can easily be justified upon a minimum
contact analysis of the relationship of nonresidents to the trust.
In a more difficult case relating to the situs of a trust, Justice
Traynor upheld California's jurisdiction over a nonresident interested party even though the situs of the trust was not in California,
on the theory that the trust itself had minimum contacts with Call-

96 Id. § 386.670.
97 Id. § 386.675.

's See id. § 386.665(2).
9 Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 467 (1939).

100 See Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810).

101 See Wilder v. United Mine Workers, 346 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Ky. 1961).
102 See Cunningham v. Fraize, 2 S.W. 551 (Ky. 1887).

103 See KRS § 386.690 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
104 Minary

v. Minary, 395 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1965).

105 Id.; Tyler v. Smith, 272 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1954).
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fornia. 106 In the more usual case in Kentucky, no jurisdictional
problem is presented by Shaffer. Again, though, it must be recognized that the resulting judgment is personal, although limited
in its extent to the value of the res.
g.

Summary

Current Kentucky statutes present no great difficulty regarding constitutional authority to adjudicate after Shaffer. Kentucky's
long-arm statute as it relates to claims arising from real property
should be extended. The other statutes authorizing specialized exercises of jurisdiction are not restricted by Shaffer, although some
have constitutional difficulties with their notice provisions.
Shaffer thus leaves the state with an ability to exercise jurisdiction, but it must be recognized that the resulting judgments are
simply limited personaljudgments. The state has the constitutional
authority to proceed, but such ability is hamstrung by deficiencies in Kentucky law stemming from statutes written for a different jurisdictional era. Our current difficulties come, not from
federal requirements, but from our own statutes. These problems
must be solved before the state can fully exercise its adjudicatory
authority.
C. Statutory Restraints on Jurisdictionin Kentucky
Despite the fact that Kentucky is left with much the same potential jurisdiction after Shaffer as it had before, the basic scheme
of how that jurisdiction is exercised must come from state law.
An adjustment in thinking away from the tripartite jurisdictional
scheme in favor of a strictly personal jurisdictional scheme requires
no adjustments in the jurisdiction statutes previously discussed.
Other statutes and procedural rules, however, will require changes
before a unified jurisdictional theory is workable.
KRS section 454.165 forbids Kentucky courts from entering
a personal judgment against a defendant who has been served with
process constructively, except as allowed under our long-arm statute. 07 What constitutes constructive service may be identified in
106 See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
107 KRS § 454.165 (1975).
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part from the caption to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
4.05-"Parties Who May Be Constructively Served."' 1 8 Since this
is the procedural rule authorizing service by warning order attorney, it follows that warning order service is constructive service. Warning order is the service used in those actions traditionally
characterized as in rem, and has been so used in Kentucky for actions against nonresidents involving divorce,' °9 probate,11 quiet
title"' and trust.11 2 Warning order service also should be
available to bind the interests of nonresidents in eminent domain
cases. Given the administrative scheme for escheats, warning order
service seems useless in that area except to join interested nonresidents in a judicial contest of the administrative decision.
If we consider the basic theory of tripartite jurisdiction that
judgments in rem did not bind nonresidents personally, the
statutory directive of KRS section 454.165 is nothing more than
a truism. A directive not to enter personal judgments in such cases
was not significant since Kentucky's courts lacked jurisdiction to
do so.
In addition to the statutory prohibition against personal judgments in cases involving constructive service, Kentucky courts also
are forbidden by CR 4.04(8) to enter a personal judgment against
an individual served out of state either in person or by certified
mail." 3 This procedural rule, when coupled with the directive of
KRS section 454.165, means that the only way in which a personal judgment could be entered against a nonresident would be
by service within the physical boundaries of the state,"4 a voluntary appearance by the defendant" s or by service through the
long-arm statute."0
This jurisdictional restriction which results from combining
KRS section 454.165 and CR 4.04(8) tracks the restrictions of due
process and full faith in the prior tripartite jurisdictional philos108KY. R. Civ. P. 4.05 [hereinafter cited as CR].
IM See Bushong v. Bushong, 114 S.W.2d 735 (Ky.

110Miller v. Hill, 168 S.W.2d at 772.
III See
112 See
113CR
114CR

Myers v. Pedigo, 72 S.W. at 735.
Minary v. Minary, 395 S.W.2d at 589.
4.04(8).
4.09.

115
See KRS § 454.165 (1975).
116 See

id.

1938).
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ophy. Because it reaches the then-existing constitutional boundaries, this jurisdictional requirement has been strictly followed
by Kentucky courts. Kentucky courts have held that the alimony
rights of a wife could not be affected by constructive service in
a divorce case,117 a conclusion mirroring the federal requirement
of personal jurisdiction for the adjudication of such rights." 8 By
the same token, an absent husband has been held unavailable to
a Kentucky court for the awarding of child support except to the
extent of property which he had in Kentucky. "9 Similar restrictions of judgments to the value of property in the state have been
applied in probate' 20 and personal judgments generally.121Further, it has been held that in cases of jurisdiction by constructive
service, no award of costs could be made against the defendant.122 In all of these cases, Kentucky was following "the universal rule that a personal judgment cannot be rendered on constructive service alone, which is employed only in proceedings in

remn."123

After the rejection of the direct-indirect effects dichotomy in
Shaffer, courts have jurisdiction to enter only one form of judgment. All judgments are personal in nature, but may be limited
in scope. Since all judgments against nonresidents in the areas of
ex parte divorce, eminent domain, escheat, probate, quiet title
and trusts are personal, it follows that the entry of such judgments
is forbidden by KRS section 454.165 and CR 4.04(8). Even though
no federal restriction prevents the entry of such judgments, these
provisions constitute a bar under state law.
One way to avoid this dilemma is to say that there is only personal jurisdiction for federal constitutional purposes but the tripartite jurisdictional theory remains valid internally in Kentucky. So
long as our judgments do not exceed constitutional restraints, there
is no reason why such internal classifications are not permissible.
The difficulty with such an approach is that we are left with a
117 Murphy v. Murphy, 464 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1971). This would overrule the prior
decision in Hughes v. Hughes, 278 S.W. at 121.
118 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 416; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. at 541.

Pendleton v. Pendleton, 112 S.W. at 674.
120 See Young's Trustee v. Bullen, 43 S.W. 687 (Ky. 1897).
121 See Dean v. Stillwell, 145 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 1940).
122 Harp v. Stamper, 217 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Ky. 1949).
123 Bond v. Wheeler, 247 S.W. 708, 710 (Ky. 1923).

"9
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bifurcated system: in assessing jurisdiction for federal purposes,
we must weigh against one test; for state purposes, we apply a
different test. Posing even more difficulty is the fact that the internal test we would be left with is badly outdated and destined
to become even more so. Such an approach would become increasingly outmoded as jurisdiction, both federal and that of other
states, develops along the lines of Shaffer. Such a dual system is
contrary to the desire to avoid "the creation of a trap for the unwary lawyer who attempts to practice in both the state and federal
courts in Kentucky."' 124 Law schools have already ceased the
teaching of in rem jurisdiction except insofar as necessary to comprehend Shaffer. For Kentucky to retain the tripartite jurisdictional theory would place our courts in the position of retaining
a theory which is vestigal in nature.
The obvious solution to the problem is for Kentucky to reject
the tripartite jurisdictional theory, as did the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer. In so doing, all adjudications would
thereafter be personal in nature, and the restraints of KRS section 454.165 and CR 4.04(8) would have to be dealt with. The
rule can be changed easily since the Kentucky Supreme Court
makes its own procedural rulesl 2 and can quickly do away with
the offensive portion of CR 4.04(8). Changing the restriction of
KRS section 454.165 is considerably more difficult, because
legislative action is required, and the General Assembly meets only
once every two years. In addition, the Legislature has shown little interest in such mundane matters, having more important work
always before it.
If the choice was simply between updating its jurisdictional
philosophy on the one hand, and losing ex parte divorce, eminent
domain, escheat, probate, quiet title and trust jurisdiction as to
nonresidents until the Legislature might repeal KRS section
454.165 on the other, the course to choose would be clear. The
Kentucky Supreme Court is not likely to allow such a jurisdictional
gap to occur; if adhering to the old theories is the only way to
prevent such an event, the old theory should prevail in order to
prevent a great mischief. However, the Court should be able to

124 Pearman v. Schlaak, 575 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Ky. 1978) (Reed, J., dissenting).
125See Ky. CoNsr. § 116.
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simultaneously update its procedural theory and yet also negate
the effect of KRS section 454.165.
First, it must be recalled that KRS section 454.165 is nothing
more than a truism relating to the tripartite jurisdictional theory;
it did not restrain the courts any more than they were already constitutionally restrained. It follows, therefore, that the Legislature
did not intend to forbid the courts to exercise authority up to the
level of constitutional validity. Indeed, such a statutory restraint
would be the converse of state long-arm statutes directing courts
to exercise jurisdiction to the full limits of constitutional
authority. 126 Not being intended to bar constitutionally valid adjudications, the statute should not be applied to restrain the courts
from exercising jurisdiction under the new jurisdictional theory.
Thus, in choosing between the legislative directive to exercise
jurisdiction in such cases as divorce, eminent domain, escheat, probate, quiet title and trusts and the legislative restraint on jurisdiction in KRS section 454.165, the Court should find the directive
to exercise jurisdiction is controlling.
As an alternative to this statutory construction approach, it
can be argued that KRS section 454.165 is an unconstitutional restriction on the Kentucky judiciary. The Kentucky Constitution
directs that the circuit courts be vested with jurisdiction of "all
justiciable causes not vested in some other court."' The General
Assembly has similarly directed that the circuit court shall be a
"court of general jurisdiction."'12 Purely as a matter of statutory
construction, KRS section 454.165 might fall to the later-enacted
directive of KRS section 24A.010(1) concerning general jurisdiction. Kentucky's courts have been jealous in protecting the prerogatives of the judiciary, 12 and a legislative directive which so
greatly infringes on the judicial power may be considered uncon-

12 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33
(1970). Note that if a statute directs such broad jurisdiction, its converse would be a directive
not to exercise jurisdiction in excess of constitutional limits, exactly the directive of the
Kentucky statute.
127 Ky. CONST. § 112(5).
128 KRS § 23A.010(I) (1980).
129 See, e.g., Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980);

McCoy v. Western Baptist Hosp., 628 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Travis v. Landrum, 607 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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stitutional. Such a legislative directive could be fairly said to impede the administration of justice and hence be an unconstitutional
infringement on the judiciary. 130 That could not be said when
the statute was merely declaratory of existing constitutional law.
The better approach in resolving this problem is for Kentucky
courts to avoid KRS section 454.165 as a matter of statutory construction and hope that the General Assembly would confirm that
result. The problem posed by the statute does not necessitate the
sort of foundation-shaking finding of infringement called for in
cases of confrontation among the branches of government.' 3' The
provisions of KRS section 454.165 are merely from another era
and hence can be dispatched by a resort to a process of reasoning
which accommodates the best interests of all branches of
government.
If the problems caused by conceptualizing all judgments as
being personal in nature can be solved, Kentucky jurisdictional
law will move into the mainstream of modem authority. However,
a constitutionally valid jurisdictional scheme requires more than
a jurisdictional basis; it must also provide for a constitutionally
valid notice scheme. Any comprehensive overhaul of our law must
address the notice problem as well.
II.

A.

RETHINKING NOTICE

ConstitutionalNotice Standards

One idea inherent in the idea of due process is that a defendant must be provided with reasonable notice of the proceeding.
Adjudications in the absence of sufficient notice violate due process in the rendering state'32 and are not entitled to full faith and
credit in sister states. In the heyday of tripartite jurisdiction, the
notice standards required in in personam cases were not applied
in in rem cases, because
It]he law assumes that property is always in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory
13( See Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938).
131 See generally Leathers, Civil Procedure,71 KY. L.J. 395 (1982-83) (criticizing
the trend in Kentucky toward assumption of the judiciary of a place as first among equals).
132 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 306; McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 25 (1969).
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that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is taken into
the custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings
authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and
sale.133

The extreme illustration of this distinction during that period was
the statement that no notice other than seizure need be given in
regard to an in rem proceeding. 13 As to an intangible like a
debt, there was some doubt in practice about whether seizure constituted adequate notice. But that approach was upheld in Harris v. Balk,'I although the Court indicated that the debtor in
that case might lose the defense of the judgment if he did not notify
his creditor that the debt had been garnished by a third party.'-a
The view that seizure constitutes notice met an insurmountable fact pattern in Mullane v. Central Bank & Trust Co. 13
when the plaintiff was the party entrusted with the care of the
res; the trustee's knowledge of the proceeding did not protect the
defendant owners, who in that fact pattern were adverse to the
custodian. Under those peculiar circumstances, a proceeding with
aspects of both in personam and in rem jurisdiction, the Court
held that the notice standards previously applied in in personam
cases would apply to all actions, regardless of their jurisdictional
bases."3 Although some doubted its application to cases purely in
rem, such an application was subsequently confirmed by the Court
in an eminent domain action.'39
The current constitutional notice standard is derived from Mullane and the in personam notice cases which preceded it. Defendants must be provided "notice reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."' 140 In arriving at a notice scheme reasonably calculated
133 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 727.
134 See Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 55 N.E. at 813. This opinion
was authored by Oliver Holmes before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court.
15 198 U.S. at 215.
'36 Id. at 227.
137 339 U.S. at 306.
138 Id. at 312-13.
139 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. at 115.
140 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 314.
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to actually inform, "It]he means employed must be such as one

desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it."'4 This requires plaintiffs to proceed as if they
really wanted the defendant to receive actual notice of the suit.
This may not seem remarkable, but compared with assertions that
seizure alone was sufficient2 or that adequate notice was given
by posting notice on the door of a courthouse in a state in which
the defendant did not reside'" or by publishing notice instead
of mailing it when the whereabouts of the defendant were
known, 144 the doctrine is revolutionary indeed.
The statutory notice scheme requirements are further refined
by Wuchter v. Pizzutti,1' in which it was held that the notice
scheme must be contained in the law itself, not simply provided
by some ad hoc procedure.'4 Although some might argue that
the strength of the Wuchter requirement is diminished by National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 147 this requirement has
been applied recently to invalidate a portion of the Oklahoma longarm statute. 48 Taken at face value, Wuchter indicates that any
statute not providing on its face for a sufficient notice procedure
is unconstitutional. Upon closer inspection, however, what Wuchter sought to achieve was a system of notice requiredby law, rather
than created by some ad hoc adoption on a case by case basis.
It seems that such an end is equally accomplished when the notice
provisions come from legal sources other than the face of a particular statute. If this assumption is correct, it would not be
necessary for every individual jurisdictional statute to have a builtId. at 315.
142 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720.
143See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. at 216.
144See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 309.
145 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
146 Id. at 18-24. This requirement seems especially serious in view of the fact that
the notice procedure used in Wuchter had been found constitutionally sufficient in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Despite actual notice having been received by the defendant, the state procedure was struck in Wuchter. "Not having been directed by the statute
it can not, therefore, supply constitutional validity to the statute or to service under it."
276 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
147375 U.S. 311 (1964). This opinion actually has no bearing on Wuchter. The issue
in Szukhent was the sufficiency of notice under a contractuallyprovided notice term. This
is a fundamentally different problem than notice provided under law.
148 See Rose v. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215, 219 (10th Cir. 1979).
141
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in notice provision; such provisions could be supplied equally by
procedural rules.
As a final matter, one should remember that, although actual notice to the defendant is the goal of the procedure, the securing of such notice is not the test of constitutional sufficiency. In
Wuchter, the procedure was struck despite having resulted in actual notice. Likewise, cases must be able to proceed even though
actual notice is not accomplished. All that is constitutionally required is the devising of a notice scheme in law which is reasonably
calculated to inform; actual notice is not required, nor will actual notice save an invalid legal system.
B.

Kentucky Notice Provisions

Kentucky notice procedures have not been revamped since the
United States Supreme Court decision in Mullane. As to the various
in rem actions identified previously (ex parte divorce, eminent domain, escheat, probate, quiet title and trusts), Kentucky's highest
court has held that "due process of law does not demand that actual notice of the suit should be served upon the defendant personally, if he be a nonresident. The law presumes that he keeps
in touch with his property, and that he will be straightway informed if any peril threatens it." 4° The Court also has said: "In
such proceedings it is not the law that actual notice to the parties
whose interests are to be affected by the judgment is essential .... "1s0 This sort of thinking about notice obviously cannot
survive Mullane. The inquiry here is whether the various provisions of Kentucky law satisfy Mullane, regardless of the outdated
philosophy of the Kentucky courts.
The normal mode of giving notice is through the warning order
attorney provisions of CR 4.05-.11. Service by warning order is
expressly called for in eminent domain proceedings'5' and in judicial challenges to escheatment.152 Such service is authorized in
district court probate'- and seems required in circuit court pro149
'50
151
152

Hughes v. Hughes, 278 S.W. at 123.
Miller v. Hill, 168 S.W.2d at 771.
See KRS § 416.590 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
See id. § 393.160 (1972).

153 See id. § 394.190 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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bate proceedings.'5 Although not called for in the statutes autho-

rizing divorce and trust actions; case law indicates warning order
service is authorized in divorce,'1 and it may be used to supplement the elaborate notice provisions of the trust statutes. 15 6 Al-

though not called for in the statute, quiet title cases authorize service by warning order. 157
For these statutes, most of which lack any built-in notice provisions, service by warning order is the only notice required. If
Wuchter requires jurisdictional statutes to have their own builtin notice provisions, the trust statute with its elaborate provisionsl' would be the only Kentucky statute to pass constitutional

muster. 159 Assuming that constitutional validity can be supplied
by procedural rules, the other statutes depend either expressly or
by interpretation on the warning order practice for their validity. The question is whether that procedure can survive the con-

stitutional notice standards of Mullane.
A warning order attorney is obligated to "make diligent efforts to inform the defendant, by mail, concerning the pendency

and nature of the action against him."' 60 There is no obligation
upon the warning order attorney to use certified mail, however.
1-%See id. § 394.260 (Cum. Supp. 1982); id. § 394.280(1) (1972).
15 See Gayle v. Gayle, 192 S.W.2d at 822; Bushong v. Bushong, 114 S.W.2d at 736.
156 See Minary v. Minary, 395 S.W.2d at 588.
157See Savin v. Delaney, 16 S.W.2d 1039 (Ky. 1929).
1'8KRS § 386.665(3) (Curn. Supp. 1982) provides:
The petitioner shall cause notice of the time and place of the hearing of any
petition to be given to any interested person or his attorney if he has appeared by attorney or requested that notice be given to his attorney. Notice
shall be given: (a) by mailing a copy thereof in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure by certified, registered or ordinary first-class mail addressed
to the person being notified at the post-office address given in his demand
for notice, if any, or at his office or place of residence, if known; (b) by delivering a copy thereof to the person being notified personally in accordance with
the Rules of Civil Procedure; or (c) if the address, 6r identity of any person
is not known and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence, by
publishing at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, a copy thereof
in a newspaper having general circulation in the county where the hearing
is to be held, the last publication of which is to be at least ten (10) days before
the time set for the hearing.
159
The escheat statute has satisfactory notice provisions regarding the administrative
proceeding, KBS § 393.110(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1982), but has no such provisions in judicial
proceedings to set aside the administrative proceeding. See id. § 393.160 (1972).
160CR 4.07(1).
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In view of the holding in Wuchter 1 61 the validity of warning
order service must be determined upon its requirement of ordinary
mail, rather than on a procedure using certified mail which might
be followed ad hoc in a particular case. Purely as a matter of Kentucky law, it is difficult to justify the dichotomy between ordinary
mail service in warning order procedure and the requirement of
certified mail which is otherwise authorized by CR 4 for service
on persons in Kentucky 162 and outside Kentucky. 16 If certified
mail service is what Kentucky regards as being reasonably calculated to actually inform in other instances, why is there a lesser
standard for warning order? Does the disparity suggest that Kentucky actually prefers that persons proceeded against by warning
order not learn of the action? If the answer to the latter is affirmative, the warning order scheme would fail under the Mullane
test. It is true that the Supreme Court in Mullane did allow service by ordinary mail rather than by registered mail.163 One
might distinguish that fact from practice today by comparing the
quality of ordinary mail service today with that in 1950. A more
sensible distinction comes from the peculiar facts in Mullane: the
Court noted that ordinary mail notice would probably reach most
of the beneficiaries and that any defense made by those with notice
would be identical to that of the non-notified defendants' 6 -in
effect viewing the action as akin to a class action. In the more
ordinary case of warning order notice, though, service by certified
mail apparently would be required to meet the Mullane standard.
In addition to requiring notice by certified mail, a notice
scheme should provide for notice in cases in which the mail is returned unclaimed or in which no address for the defendant is
known. In those cases, the rule should require publication. Currently, such publication is only required in trust cases ' 66 and escheat cases. 67 In the other actions for ex parte divorce, eminent
161 For a discussion of theWuchter case and its holding, see notes 145-48, supra and
accompanying text.
162 CR 4.01(1)(a).
163 CR 4.04(8).
164 See 339 U.S. at 319.
165Id.
166 KRS § 386.665(3)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
167 Id. § 393.110(1)(d). This publication requirement attaches to the administrative
proceeding, not to judicial contests of the administrative decision and hence does not save
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domain, probate and quiet title, it seems reasonable to provide
for published notice directed to the absent party in a newspaper
in the county where the litigation is pending. Rather than amending each of the statutory schemes, the Kentucky Supreme Court
could amend CR 4.04(8) and CR 4.07(1) to accomplish this new
notice scheme.
The above modifications in the existing provisions of CR
4.04(8) and CR 4.07 would make needed corrections within the
existing framework of the civil rules. Some thought should be given
to a more significant change. The purpose in retaining the warning order practice at all is to provide a notice scheme. For that
function the warning order rule seems redundant with CR 4.04(8).
Indeed, given the application of CR 4.04(8) to service on persons
outside Kentucky, the exact circumstances in which one may proceed under that rule rather than under the warning order rule
are questionable. Although it may be argued that the warning
order rule serves a dual function, with the warning order attorney
being required to make any possible defense to the action following an unsuccessful notice attempt, 1' s in practice this function is
rarely fulfilled. In view of the practical working of the rule simply as a notice provision, the warning order rule should be abolished.
If it was thought to be desirable to keep the requirement that the
court retain control of the property or proceeds of an absent party for one year after judgment,169 that feature of the rule could
simply be added to CR 4.04(8).
This saving clause feature of CR 4.11 is similar to the savings
provisions in regard to escheats 7° and wills.'17 These provisions
all establish a grace period during which absent parties may reopen
judgments and have their rights adjudicated. Following the expiration of the grace period, it has been held that the judgments
are binding even on parties who had no notice of the proceeding both as to wills172 and escheats.'73 In actuality, these grace

the judicial proceeding from being constitutionally defective.
" CR 4.07(2).
169 CR 4.11.
170 KRS § 393.140(1), (2) (1972).
171Id. § 394.280(1).
172
173

Crain v. Crain, 104 S.W.2d at 992.
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. at 233.
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periods need not be retained and in fact should be abolished. Adjudications in all cases are constitutionally valid and final provided
they have been rendered with jurisdiction and with a sufficient
notice scheme. Following Kentucky's adoption of a sufficient notice
scheme for all such proceedings, these adjudications should be
treated by statute and rule like any other decision. They may be
attacked in accordance with the existing provisions of the rules
relating to all judgments4 but should not be singled out for any
special treatment.
III.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Kentucky needs a comprehensive restructuring of its judicial
philosophy regarding jurisdiction and notice in order to bring it
into the mainstream of current legal thinking. In particular, Kentucky needs to adjust existing statutory provisions and procedural
rules relating to jurisdiction and notice to comply with existing
due process interpretations of the United States Supreme Court.
The following steps are recommended:
(1) Decisional recognition that courts exercise only one form
of jurisdiction-personal jurisdiction. Of course, adjudications may
be limited in scope as appropriate circumstances dictate.
(2) Deletion from CR 4.04(8) of the following: "Such service
without an appearance shall not authorize a personal judgment,
but for all other purposes the individual summoned shall be before
the court as in other cases of personal service."
(3) Circumvention of the restrictions of KRS section 454.165
either by statutory construction or by constitutional invalidation.
In the alternative, the statute should be repealed.
(4) Amendment of CR 4.07(1) to provide that notice mailed
by warning order attorney be by certified mail.
(5) As an alternative to (4), abolition of the warning order
practice by striking CR 4.05-.10. Subject to (6), the provisions of
CR 4.11 may be transferred and renumbered as CR 4.04(10).
(6) Deletion of the grace period features of Kentucky law by
repeal of KRS sections 393.140(1) and 394.280(1) and judicial
amendment to strike CR 4.11.
174

The ordinary method of attack of all judgments at the trial level is through the

provisions of CR 60.01 & 60.02.
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(7) Addition to CR 4.04(8) and to CR 4.07(1) of a requirement of notice by publication for cases of failed notice attempts,
in the event warning order practice is not completely abolished.
(8) Amendment of Kentucky's long-arm statute, KRS section
454.210(6), to delete all restrictive language following the phrase
"in this Commonwealth."
Until such a comprehensive restructuring is undertaken, practice in Kentucky will be tied to a procedural system which has
outlived its usefulness. Our system has been, and is, much more
progressive than that. All that is needed is an opportunity to think
these matters through comprehensively.

